Publications
Can Gestation Ground Parental Rights?
Social Theory and Practice
In law and common-sense morality, it is generally assumed that adults who meet a minimum threshold of parental competency have a presumptive right to parent their biological children. But what is the basis of this right? According to one influential account, the right to parent one’s biological child is best understood as being grounded in an intimate relationship that develops between babies and their birth parents during the process of gestation. This paper identifies three major problems facing this view—the explanatory, adjudicatory, and theoretical problems—and proposes an alternative autonomy-based account that is capable of avoiding them.
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How to Reject Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument
Bioethics
In this paper, I reconsider David Benatar’s primary argument for anti-natalism—the asymmetry argument—and outline a three-step process for rejecting it. I begin in Part I by reconstructing the asymmetry argument into three main premises. I then turn in Parts II-IV to explain how each of these premises is in fact false. Finally, I conclude in Part V by considering the relationship between the asymmetry argument and the quality of life argument in Benatar’s overall case for anti-natalism and argue that it is the latter argument that is actually doing the work. In this sense, the asymmetry argument is not only unsuccessful in generating Benatar’s anti-natalist conclusion; it is also unnecessary as well.
Parental Justice and the Kids Pay View
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
In a just society, who should be liable for the significant costs associated with creating and raising children? Patrick Tomlin has recently argued that children themselves should be liable on the grounds that they benefit from being raised into independent adults. This view, which Tomlin calls 'Kids Pay', depends on the more general principle that a beneficiary can incur an obligation to share in the cost of an essential benefit that the benefactor is responsible for her requiring. I argue in this paper that this principle is both generally false and particularly suspect in the kinds of cases that Tomlin needs it to be true, namely, cases in which a benefactor has created the need to be benefitted to satisfy a self-regarding interest in providing the benefit. In a nutshell, I argue that because parents (a) electively put their children into a needy circumstance for the purpose of (b) satisfying a self-regarding interest in meeting their children’s needs, they lack a legitimate claim against their children to share in its associated costs.
Children’s Rights and the Non-Identity Problem
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Can appealing to children’s rights help to solve the non-identity problem in cases of procreation? A number of philosophers have answered affirmatively, arguing that even if children cannot be harmed by being born into disadvantaged conditions, they may nevertheless be wronged if those conditions fail to meet a minimal standard of decency to which all children are putatively entitled. This paper defends the tenability of this view by outlining and responding to five prominent objections that have been raised against it in the contemporary literature: (1) the identifiability objection; (2) the non-existence objection; (3) the waiving of rights objection, (4) the lack of legitimate complaint objection; and (5) the unfairness objection.
Do Motives Matter? On the Political Relevance of Procreative Reasons (with Steven Lecce)
Permissible Progeny? The Morality of Procreation and Parenting (Oxford University Press)
According to the "reasons-relevance" thesis, why we have children matters for assessing the morality of our procreative conduct. In this paper, we consider whether, and on what grounds, procreative motives might be politically relevant. We argue that reasonable disagreement about procreative motives complicates an extension of the reasons-relevance thesis into the political domain. Taking that disagreement seriously leads to the doctrine of liberal neutrality, and its attendant notion of public reason. The application of public reason to procreative motives generates what we call the Principle of Presumptive Motivational Irrelevance (PPMI). According to that principle, the state must tolerate otherwise morally suspect procreative motives so long as, when acted upon, they do not violate the justice-based entitlements of others. Similarly, it cannot tolerate such violations even when they are motivated by otherwise morally innocuous motives.
Review of David Benatar and David Wasserman's Debating Procreation: Is it Wrong to Reproduce?
Social Theory and Practice
Review of Sarah Conly's One Child: Do We Have a Right to More?
Contemporary Political Theory
Can Gestation Ground Parental Rights?
Social Theory and Practice
In law and common-sense morality, it is generally assumed that adults who meet a minimum threshold of parental competency have a presumptive right to parent their biological children. But what is the basis of this right? According to one influential account, the right to parent one’s biological child is best understood as being grounded in an intimate relationship that develops between babies and their birth parents during the process of gestation. This paper identifies three major problems facing this view—the explanatory, adjudicatory, and theoretical problems—and proposes an alternative autonomy-based account that is capable of avoiding them.
e
How to Reject Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument
Bioethics
In this paper, I reconsider David Benatar’s primary argument for anti-natalism—the asymmetry argument—and outline a three-step process for rejecting it. I begin in Part I by reconstructing the asymmetry argument into three main premises. I then turn in Parts II-IV to explain how each of these premises is in fact false. Finally, I conclude in Part V by considering the relationship between the asymmetry argument and the quality of life argument in Benatar’s overall case for anti-natalism and argue that it is the latter argument that is actually doing the work. In this sense, the asymmetry argument is not only unsuccessful in generating Benatar’s anti-natalist conclusion; it is also unnecessary as well.
Parental Justice and the Kids Pay View
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
In a just society, who should be liable for the significant costs associated with creating and raising children? Patrick Tomlin has recently argued that children themselves should be liable on the grounds that they benefit from being raised into independent adults. This view, which Tomlin calls 'Kids Pay', depends on the more general principle that a beneficiary can incur an obligation to share in the cost of an essential benefit that the benefactor is responsible for her requiring. I argue in this paper that this principle is both generally false and particularly suspect in the kinds of cases that Tomlin needs it to be true, namely, cases in which a benefactor has created the need to be benefitted to satisfy a self-regarding interest in providing the benefit. In a nutshell, I argue that because parents (a) electively put their children into a needy circumstance for the purpose of (b) satisfying a self-regarding interest in meeting their children’s needs, they lack a legitimate claim against their children to share in its associated costs.
Children’s Rights and the Non-Identity Problem
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Can appealing to children’s rights help to solve the non-identity problem in cases of procreation? A number of philosophers have answered affirmatively, arguing that even if children cannot be harmed by being born into disadvantaged conditions, they may nevertheless be wronged if those conditions fail to meet a minimal standard of decency to which all children are putatively entitled. This paper defends the tenability of this view by outlining and responding to five prominent objections that have been raised against it in the contemporary literature: (1) the identifiability objection; (2) the non-existence objection; (3) the waiving of rights objection, (4) the lack of legitimate complaint objection; and (5) the unfairness objection.
Do Motives Matter? On the Political Relevance of Procreative Reasons (with Steven Lecce)
Permissible Progeny? The Morality of Procreation and Parenting (Oxford University Press)
According to the "reasons-relevance" thesis, why we have children matters for assessing the morality of our procreative conduct. In this paper, we consider whether, and on what grounds, procreative motives might be politically relevant. We argue that reasonable disagreement about procreative motives complicates an extension of the reasons-relevance thesis into the political domain. Taking that disagreement seriously leads to the doctrine of liberal neutrality, and its attendant notion of public reason. The application of public reason to procreative motives generates what we call the Principle of Presumptive Motivational Irrelevance (PPMI). According to that principle, the state must tolerate otherwise morally suspect procreative motives so long as, when acted upon, they do not violate the justice-based entitlements of others. Similarly, it cannot tolerate such violations even when they are motivated by otherwise morally innocuous motives.
Review of David Benatar and David Wasserman's Debating Procreation: Is it Wrong to Reproduce?
Social Theory and Practice
Review of Sarah Conly's One Child: Do We Have a Right to More?
Contemporary Political Theory
In Progress and Under Review
Disability, Relational Equality, and the Expressivist Objection
Since the early 1990s, one of the most prominent objections to the use of prenatal or pre-implantation testing to prevent the birth of children with disabilities has focused on the negative judgments it expresses to and about existing persons with disabilities. Commonly known as the expressivist objection, it is based on the conjunction of two key claims: (1) the use or provision of tests to select against disability in offspring expresses negative judgments about existing persons with disabilities; and (2) the expression of these judgments itself constitutes an injustice to those persons. Despite depending on both claims, however, philosophical discussion of the expressivist objection has largely centered on the first: while commentators continue to debate whether disability screening does or does not express negative judgments, relatively little attention has been paid to explaining how the expression of those judgements constitutes an injustice to persons with disabilities. In this paper, I argue (a) that whether or not the expressivist objection succeeds will ultimately depend on whether a plausible explanation can be supplied for how persons with disabilities are wronged by the expression of negative judgments, and (b) that existing literature surrounding relational egalitarianism can provide such an explanation, albeit with important limitations.
How to Reject Benatar's Quality of Life Argument
David Benatar’s central case for anti-natalism is based on two distinct though mutually supporting arguments: the asymmetry argument, which purports to show that existence is always comparatively worse than non-existence; and the quality of life argument, which purports to show that existence is always non-comparatively bad. I have argued elsewhere that the asymmetry argument must rely on the truth of the quality of life argument, and hence that the quality of life argument should be the primary focus of critics who are skeptical of Benatar’s anti-natalist position. Thus, my goal in this paper is to show how, and why, the quality of life argument ought to be rejected. I begin in Part 2 by reconstructing the quality of life argument into three main premises. I then turn in Parts 3 – 5 to outline three objections to these premises respectively, namely, the Circularity Objection, the Evaluative Objection, and the Normativity Objection. Finally, in Part 6, I consider Benatar’s related risk-based argument for anti-natalism and explain why it fails to support the judgment that procreation is categorically impermissible. My ultimate conclusion is that while the quality of life argument might succeed in showing that human lives are worse than we tend to realize, it does not succeed in showing that it is always wrong to initiate a human life.
Disability, Relational Equality, and the Expressivist Objection
Since the early 1990s, one of the most prominent objections to the use of prenatal or pre-implantation testing to prevent the birth of children with disabilities has focused on the negative judgments it expresses to and about existing persons with disabilities. Commonly known as the expressivist objection, it is based on the conjunction of two key claims: (1) the use or provision of tests to select against disability in offspring expresses negative judgments about existing persons with disabilities; and (2) the expression of these judgments itself constitutes an injustice to those persons. Despite depending on both claims, however, philosophical discussion of the expressivist objection has largely centered on the first: while commentators continue to debate whether disability screening does or does not express negative judgments, relatively little attention has been paid to explaining how the expression of those judgements constitutes an injustice to persons with disabilities. In this paper, I argue (a) that whether or not the expressivist objection succeeds will ultimately depend on whether a plausible explanation can be supplied for how persons with disabilities are wronged by the expression of negative judgments, and (b) that existing literature surrounding relational egalitarianism can provide such an explanation, albeit with important limitations.
How to Reject Benatar's Quality of Life Argument
David Benatar’s central case for anti-natalism is based on two distinct though mutually supporting arguments: the asymmetry argument, which purports to show that existence is always comparatively worse than non-existence; and the quality of life argument, which purports to show that existence is always non-comparatively bad. I have argued elsewhere that the asymmetry argument must rely on the truth of the quality of life argument, and hence that the quality of life argument should be the primary focus of critics who are skeptical of Benatar’s anti-natalist position. Thus, my goal in this paper is to show how, and why, the quality of life argument ought to be rejected. I begin in Part 2 by reconstructing the quality of life argument into three main premises. I then turn in Parts 3 – 5 to outline three objections to these premises respectively, namely, the Circularity Objection, the Evaluative Objection, and the Normativity Objection. Finally, in Part 6, I consider Benatar’s related risk-based argument for anti-natalism and explain why it fails to support the judgment that procreation is categorically impermissible. My ultimate conclusion is that while the quality of life argument might succeed in showing that human lives are worse than we tend to realize, it does not succeed in showing that it is always wrong to initiate a human life.
